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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM : Harry E. Fitzwater
Director of Training

SUBJECT : Seminar Reports from the Center for the
Study of Intelligence

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1. In response to your expressed interest in the distribution of CSI's seminar and discussion group reports, I have attached a list of reports distributed over the past year along with several examples. Distribution is usually made in 100 to 200 copies to offices and to individuals throughout the Agency who we believe would be interested in the subject of the particular report. Several reports, including the one attached on ethics in DDO work, have been given very limited distribution due to the subject matter.

2. We have received a number of written and verbal reactions to the reports, although not as much as we would like. We know that many of the copies are passed around to other officers by the addressees. In one case, a seminar report is being gisted and reprinted in the RONI--an Intelligence Community Staff publication.

3. At present, a cover sheet for CSI studies and reports is being designed which will perhaps make them stand out a bit better in the welter of paper which floods in upon most officers and offices in the Agency.


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CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Multi-disciplinary Analysis in the CIA

25X1A Recently, the Center for the Study of Intelligence in OTR asked [REDACTED] to address a discussion group organized by the Center on the subject of multi-disciplinary analysis in the CIA. You may be interested in the following account, prepared by the 25X1A CSI staff, of [REDACTED] point of view on this subject.

In essence, [REDACTED] believes that the nature of current world problems warrants a more integrated analytic approach in intelligence, but that such analysis is exceedingly difficult to perform well and would take an approach and training most of our analysts lack. He does not believe that training in academic institutions can satisfactorily equip our people to do it. He instead suggested the outlines of an internal approach within the Agency to develop the necessary training.

25X1A [REDACTED] views provided the group with some stimulating thoughts for discussion, although there was by no means full agreement with his position. As you may know, [REDACTED] 25X1A

has written several perceptive articles in the past on subjects of intelligence theory and analysis.

Complexity of the Issues

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We asked [REDACTED] to address three questions, the first being the extent to which he felt that the analysis of major foreign policy issues today requires more of a true multi-disciplinary or integrated analytical approach. "The currently fashionable answer," he said, "is to a much more increasing extent. However, if one is seriously interested in historical approaches to international problems and if one is familiar with previous history in various parts of the world, he will recognize that problems have always been complex. Economic factors, for example, have always impinged very importantly. Changes in social stratification have always affected the stability and viability of societies. Therefore, sociological analysis has always been applicable. There is now a fashionable emphasis on the complexity in international relations. Fashions do call the attention of people to elements of a problem that have received insufficient attention in the past.

But I am not saying that nothing has changed. One thing that has changed over the last ten years is our awareness of complexities. We are much more conscious

of the necessity of looking at complex problems in a complex way. The content of our political outlook has shifted toward economic problems. This is the result of several changes. In the very rich societies, there has been a generation of new, voluminous demands for additional goods and services--mostly materiel. The demands on the state as a redistributing agency are much more than before. Western Europe, Japan, the United States have turned away from building up military capabilities and using them aggressively to settle problems. The foreign policy agenda of these societies has become restructured with a greater concern for economic issues. In addition, some societies, for example in West Europe, have been involved in the formation of economic unions. All of this has catapulted economic issues into the forefront of political decisions. Similarly, if you look at the LDC's, many of the governments and elites, or the counterelites, regard economic problems as enormously important. It is thus very clear that there has been some sort of increasing interest in economic factors and these factors interact in a complex way with political, social, and military factors. In essence, this has meant a change in our perception of that reality."

Academic Adaption

Our second question to [REDACTED] was, "How has the academic world adapted to these changes in perception and to the possible need for a different analytical framework?" "On the whole," he said, "not very well. The institutional lag is all about us. We have focused on attempts to combine economic and political analysis. This has been done primarily by political scientists, mostly young ones. With few exceptions, economists have not made a complementary move. It is always the weaker and less secure discipline that makes the adjustments. The more secure one has far less incentive to innovate.

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young people for work in Government in a multi-disciplinary way. In practice, this means mostly combining work in political science and economics with small amounts of sociology and history. In my opinion, we have not done well. We have not been able to do in practice what we say on paper. Those students at the school who emphasize the economic track take very little political science. Those who chose the political analysis track are required to take as a minimum a quantitative course, micro-economics,

macro-economics, international economics. Many take more. At the end of two years, when the students take their general exams--and I have administered many of these--with rare exception it is apparent that very little analytical integration has taken place. There is very little inter-connection between economics and political science, very little capacity for interdisciplinary analysis. The main reason is that economists at the Woodrow Wilson School teach as economists always teach economics--pure economics. Political analysts don't teach in an interdisciplinary way. The other schools--like J.F. Kennedy at Harvard, have had the same experience. The Woodrow Wilson experience is not unique."

An Agency Approach

Our final question to [REDACTED] asked him to speculate 25X1A on ways the intelligence community might attempt to cope with multi-disciplinary issues more effectively. In reply he noted that in the course of his academic work, he had attempted to assess how effectively academics and those in government had dealt with international threat perception--a multi-faceted analytic problem. He decided to study threat perception historically, and analyzed 45 cases. He quickly realized that threat perception as a matter of statecraft

25X1A has always been done badly. "It is astonishing," he said "that nobody recognizes this very well." He implied that this was true in part because of the failure of analysts to be sufficiently aware of the variety of factors that play on any given situation. History is one such factor. Recently, according to [REDACTED] he has started on a new major project and "become interested in detente as an interstate relationship. There is practically no literature on this type of interstate relationship. Nobody has really studied it. I have identified about 30 cases across history. I am studying these cases comparatively. How did they come about? How well did detente cope with the problems of the day? What comes after detente? Without turning to historical knowledge, I don't think one could do much in analyzing the prospects for the present detente. I believe historical studies should be a part of the training of intelligence specialists. Without historical knowledge, our understanding of contemporary problems is condemned to be flat--superficial. All of our contemporary problems are types that have occurred many times before. To find out how people have worked--coped--with these types of problems in the past, with what consequences, becomes important, and gives us an appreciation of what could happen in the future.

As for the overall job of the intelligence specialist, it is to make inferences--nothing you can be certain about--from ambiguous and fragmentary information. One must not over-generalize here. There are many intelligence problems that don't require multi-disciplinary analysis. A new Soviet bomber requires a technological approach to a military program. Multi-disciplinary analysis is not required. But if you want to go beyond estimates of Soviet grain production, for example, to the important question of whether the Soviet Union will be dependent on grain imports over next ten years, this is both a political problem and an economic problem. Regarding problems that do require a multi-disciplinary approach, splicing the results together won't do. The need is for integrated analysis which the consumer can't do himself."

Improving the Intelligence Product

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██████ then posed the question: "What can be done to improve integrated analysis? The obstacles to improvement," he said, "are many and difficult to overcome. It is not a question of doing a perfect job, but of incremental gains. As I see it in the intelligence world, the central job of employing multi-disciplinary analysis cannot be done by the cross-disciplinary team. Integration never takes place in a

committee. A team usually has a committee structure. A team will construct a product by additions, splicing, compromise. This does not mean there is no place or function for a cross-disciplinary team or committee. What a good committee or team can do is to challenge and be critical, to review the product you are talking about. The discarded Board of Estimates had this function. It was a catastrophic mistake to throw it out. Something like this will have to be reinvented, or should be. The Board tended to add last-minute integrated analysis to the product it was reviewing. One needs inter-disciplinary specialists to collect and analyze the specialist data. I would favor organizations that require cross-disciplinary molds. I would rather organize on a geographic than a functional basis. The analysts are then in a better position to discuss problems with one another readily, because they are living together and form habits of discussing, which can be very useful.

But I would not ask this kind of geographic unit for true integrative analysis. It seems to me that the ideal way of getting good integrated analysis and estimates is for one person to do it who has multi-disciplinary competence. One who is a generalist in this sense. There are great risks, of course, in this concept of the

generalist. The generalists generally learn how to become good generalists on the job. But this does not happen very often. In practice, the working generalist is often a superficial generalist who does a clever but essentially superficial job of splicing, not of integrated analysis. If this is true, is it possible to develop a true multidisciplinary individual? I believe it is but not without a great deal of difficulty and rarely to perfection. I have come across a small number of individuals who were such generalists. Usually they were regarded by the academics as mavericks. There have only been very few, not because it takes exceptional talent or brains, but because the opportunities for this career choice have been limited. It is important for you in the Agency to recognize this built-in limitation of your system on the development of the true generalist.

The level of generalist competence I am talking about would normally require graduate training. Graduate training and career opportunities at the university level suffer from the traditional compartmentalization. It is, as I have said, strictly a disciplinary approach, involving disciplinary tracks. This is because academic advancement depends on staying on a single disciplinary track. It seems to me that as things are, if you in the CIA want to produce good

cross-disciplinary competence you had best start with the young person who has mastered one discipline at the PhD level. You should induce him to develop sufficient competence in another discipline to use that knowledge as an intelligent, trained analyst. He would need opportunity and good career prospects in order to encourage him. To train someone to undertake multi-disciplinary analysis and write estimates, he should, for example, become trained in observing and getting facts that can be perceived on the interaction between the economic movements and political developments. He should focus on the interaction between disciplines. For this, you don't need to know what a PhD candidate must know. It is much less than that. For example, much of the economist's sophistication does not have much relevance to intelligence work. Economists experience very little incentive to cross economic boundaries. Political scientists are more inclined to do so.

How does one develop people with the cross-disciplinary approach as I have defined it? Two years of academic training looks unpromising. The education program is not adapted to your purposes. The only solution I can see is for the intelligence community to organize its own supplementary training program in-house or at a good academic institution. Recruit your analysts with one discipline

and give them the opportunity to learn another. I have not thought sufficiently about how this could or should be organized. One would need to go carefully over the problem of securing teachers, as well as students and curricular structure. But a well-developed program could achieve the necessary results in no more than, and probably less than, a year. Without such a program, you will not get people who can do better than in the past in a multi-disciplinary approach.

I would make one more remark on an overlapping subject. Nearly all the intelligence officers I have encountered fail to adequately use the specialist knowledge which is produced outside their own agency, especially knowledge produced at academic institutions. They feed and live on cables and paper they write for themselves, and some newspapers, I suppose. They ignore a large body of factual and theoretical knowledge produced by specialists. I don't know why failure to use this knowledge occurs. My guess is that the analysts just do not have the time to do this kind of thing. They seem always overly busy with deadlines for papers, with the reading of cables. There is very little opportunity for reflection and extending one's knowledge and checking knowledge available on the outside. That kind of leisure was never built into your system. People in the intelligence

bureaucracies have a misconception about academics. Although much that academics produce is irrelevant to intelligence, much is relevant. If this is true, it is important to loose the constraints against using academic knowledge. An intelligence officer is likely to go to seed unless he can tap knowledge which is evolving all the time outside his immediate professional experience."

REPORT OF A SEMINAR ON CIA COMPARTMENTATION

Introduction

On 1 March 1976 the Center for the Study of Intelligence sponsored the first of two seminars on the subject of compartmentation. This seminar focused on the formal compartmentation systems--their objectives, their strengths and weaknesses, and their impact on intelligence production--in light of current pressure from segments of the intelligence community to decompartment intelligence products so as to permit their use on a larger scale. Some of the specific matters it was hoped the seminar would address were a definition of the sort of "essential secrets" which require protection by compartments; the point at which protection of sources and methods restricts too greatly the dissemination and use of the information they provide; the impact of compartmentation on the various stages of the intelligence process (collection, processing/analysis, and dissemination); and suggestions for improving the existing systems and the process of decompartmentation.

Invited to the seminar were several intelligence officers familiar with various aspects of compartmentation in the CIA

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25X1A compartmentation study group of the Center for the Study of
Intelligence, headed by [REDACTED] and also consisting

25X1A [REDACTED]

Problem Areas Defined

At the beginning of the session, participants were invited to state their chief concerns about compartmentation as a means of defining the scope of the discussion to follow. [REDACTED] led off by proposing a single compartmentation system in place of the present multiple ones. [REDACTED] said he found compartmentation a handicap and challenged the necessity of having it. Capt. [REDACTED] spoke for the tactical field commander, who needs information as quickly as possible with little concern as to its ultimate source. In this situation, compartmentation is better than the present alternatives, because within the compartments (i.e., TK) information flows much more freely than under the Top Secret control system. [REDACTED] applauded the basic assumption of compartmentation that restricted access limits the possibility of the enemy's learning our secrets, but complained of a lack of flexibility in protecting information of varying sensitivity. Thus, compromised material often remains within a compartment, where it may be unavailable to analysts even though it is known to the enemy.

25X1A [REDACTED] said that compartmentation's track record is sufficient proof of its value, but complained of the

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compartmentation of control over the formal systems, a situation which has led to a multiplicity of "national" authorities. He proposed an interdepartmental review panel to refine the definition of what types of information need to be protected by the formal systems and eliminate the abuses of compartmentation which arise from competition for control over them. [REDACTED] said he believes the purpose of compartmentation to be protection of information or sources from external damage, but is concerned that some agencies interpret that to mean defending themselves against such things as criticism or budgetary scrutiny. He also saw no purpose to maintaining compartmentation controls over compromised material. [REDACTED] stressed the necessity of maintaining compartmentation to protect sensitive sources and methods, which he feels are extremely vulnerable. He complained of a general laxity in the application of both the formal and informal systems. At the same time, he felt that the end product of some systems can be sanitized without revealing the source.

[REDACTED] noted that all the aforementioned problems had been examined by Mr. [REDACTED] and a number of producers and consumers at a recent conference at the [REDACTED] In general, they agreed with the sentiments expressed at the seminar: Compartmentation is necessary for protecting sources and methods. It is time, however, to make a more realistic

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appraisal of classification and compartmentation criteria, and to separate information from the way it is collected so that it can be of greater use to a greater number. More moves in this direction are to be expected in the wake of Executive Order 11, 905.

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██████████ offered the closing statement, in which he said he thinks there is too much compartmentation. Declaring that he feels compartmentation offers no protection against losses either through a defector or through penetration, he claimed that it does restrict the flow of information among analysts and thus makes it difficult to produce the best intelligence possible. He felt we should accept the idea that some losses are inevitable, protect the sources as fully as possible, but get the information out where it is usable.

Discussion

The ensuing discussion focused mainly on the problem of how to protect sources and capabilities while still making maximum information available to those who need it. Specific difficulties arising from the present system were cited; one proposal for improving the administration of the formal systems was weighed; and a number of factors were identified as requiring consideration in the designing of any future improvements. Among the specific points addressed by the discussion were the following:

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--Compartmentation is not a clearance. It is merely the mechanism for controlling access to a particular project, or the information derived from it, which may reveal the project's existence and/or capabilities. Its purpose is to protect the project (or, in the case of HUMINT, the agent) from discovery and counter-measures. Mr. [REDACTED] stressed that the United States would lose not only existing but potential capabilities vital to the national defense if certain facts were to become known.

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--If restriction of access to sensitive information is viewed as an effective means of protecting sources and methods, then the proliferation of access approvals is clearly a threat to the system. Furthermore, damage assessment in the event something is "blown" is made much more difficult if a great number of people have access to particular compartmented information.

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Mr. [REDACTED] noted a reversal of the trend toward granting ever larger numbers of people access to the newer systems: CRS, which earlier provided all its people with SI/TK access and was planning to do the same with [REDACTED] access approvals rather tightly, since it is felt that the average analyst has access to all he needs to know about the system through the SI/TK compartment. If an uncleared

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person comes in contact with [REDACTED] he now signs an inadvertent exposure statement rather than "automatically" being approved for access to the compartment.

--A further problem with the proliferation of access approvals is that within the formal compartments information tends to be handed around freely, with minimal regard for need to know. This practice contrasts sharply with the strict application of need to know practiced by the DDO. It has the net effect of restricting the flow of information more than under the Secret classification, but less than under Top Secret, where each copy bears a cover sheet which must be signed by every individual on the routing list, and dissemination and reproduction are tightly controlled. The relative freedom of handling of compartmented material makes information more easily available to those who need it, but also increases the chance of compromise.

--If the ultimate purpose of compartmentation is to deny knowledge to the enemy, questions arise as to its application to information which has already been "blown" in the press. Some people

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feel that continued restriction of access merely denies the analyst information which the other side already has, thereby needlessly handicapping him; this charge leads to the question of who we are seeking to protect the information from. It was generally agreed that the formal compartments often do not allow for varying sensitivities of material. Mr. [REDACTED] cautioned, however, that we not throw the baby out with the bathwater. Much of the information which appears in the press is erroneous or incomplete, and therefore increases the difficulty of assessing the validity of a leak. He feels we would be needlessly compromising our sources if we automatically decompartmented material simply because it had been mentioned in the press. This would also sharpen the focus of the media and the opposition on our valid secrets. --A similar problem is the retention in compartments of information derived from sources whose capabilities have been revealed in the SALT talks, or the continued classification (SECRET/NOFORN) of the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance. Mr. [REDACTED] 25X1A pointed out that "fact of" is an illustration of the

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use of compartmentation for political reasons, a practice which tends to dilute the effectiveness of the compartment.

--The principal reason for the use of compartments and need to know is to protect sources and methods. The information derived from these sources and methods, however, is often of value to people who have no need to know from whence it came. Capt. [REDACTED] provided a dramatic example of the problems resulting from placing operational and derived information in the same compartment: He was not warned of coastal defenses in an area where he was to sail his ship because he did not have access to the SI compartment, and as a result came under enemy fire. All he would have needed to avoid the situation was the information, not knowledge of the source.

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--Although it was generally agreed that analysts can often use the intelligence in a report without knowing the source, there are occasions when a knowledge of the source and/or its capabilities is necessary. This is true, for example, for an analyst working on the product of a technical system, who needs to know the type of equipment involved or its location in order properly to evaluate the information. Some identification is also needed for formal source

evaluation by analysts, a process which is vital to future planning.

--The seminar participants concluded that making a distinction between collector, analyst, and end-product consumer would help alleviate the problems described above. The collector needs detailed knowledge of how his system operates. The processor/analyst needs to have some understanding of the source in order to do his job with maximum effectiveness. The consumer, however, usually needs only the digested, analyzed information in a form that he can easily digest and use. CIA, in most cases, is a processor, not a consumer, and therefore frequently has a need for source information which some collectors (notably NSA) withhold on the ground that consumers do not need to know it. A three-tiered system of compartmentation which took these differing needs into account would greatly assist in solving the problem of protecting sources and methods while still making available the information they collect.

--The present system of compartmentation leads to practices--occasionally, to abuses--which frustrate the analyst and impede the flow of information to the user. Past instances of overclassification--

deliberate or otherwise--tend to erode analysts' confidence in collectors' statements regarding source reliability and degree of need to protect sources. Such lack of confidence may extend to the system of compartmentation in general. The practice of classifying (or compartmenting) an entire document according to the highest sensitivity of an individual item used in it can result in depriving officers of access to the rest of the information, regardless of its actual sensitivity. (The alternatives would be to decompartment, sanitize or remove the individual item.) Inconsistent explanation or application of rules regarding storage, handling, and decompartmentation of sensitive material can lead to a multiplicity of procedures for dealing with it and general confusion about the system as a whole.

--A number of problems with the present compartmentation system are psychological in nature. The granting of special access in a world where secrecy is often regarded as a status symbol has consequent effects upon the "haves" and the "have nots."

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Mr. [REDACTED] proposed that we look more deeply into the issues such as the effect upon the analyst's

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knowing (or suspecting) that he is being forced to make judgments based on incomplete information, or the feeling that some individuals are considered more trustworthy than others. Such feelings often lead to analysts' conducting private "operations" against the office(s) they feel are denying them needed information, a practice which runs counter to the intent of compartmentation. In this atmosphere, the mere presence of the visible signs of compartmentation (codewords, markings on documents, letters on a badge) leads to curiosity about the project or compartment so identified. It was generally agreed that while attempting to find out more about such activities might be "unprofessional," it was an undeniable aspect of human nature and posed another threat to compartmentation. Finally, in a world in which restricted access is thought to confer status, there is a tendency to overclassify or overcompartment documents in order to call them to the attention of one's superiors who are supposedly too busy to pay attention to "mere" Secret or noncodeword material. To the degree that this practice exists, it runs counter to the present policy of downgrading or declassifying

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in order to make the information as widely available as possible.

- Bureaucratic compartmentation between different offices in CIA--usually involving the DDO--was also charged. Again, the basic problem was that of collectors attempting to protect sources from those on the "outside," without distinguishing between processors and consumers. Attempting to get needed information from the DDO is even more difficult than from the formal compartments because of the lack of centralization and control over need to know and bigot listed operations.
- The first step in attempting to remedy any situation in which needed information is being denied is for supervisors (office chiefs, branch chiefs, etc.) to be continually aware of the needs of their subordinates and to do everything possible to insure that they are granted access to those compartments, bigot lists, etc., which contain information they require.
- While the compartmentation study group's charter and the scope of its paper are restricted to problems within CIA, it was recognized that any proposed change in the system would affect the entire intelligence community. That there are

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several ramifications to this fact was brought out in discussion of Mr. [REDACTED] proposal that a review board be set up to make policy and resolve disputes. Because organizations have in the past used compartmentation to protect their special interests, it was feared that some might refuse to release information even to such a board. It was also questioned whether the board itself, being composed of departmental representatives, would wind up on the side of the "establishment" rather than that of the analyst--whether it would come to have a proprietary interest in the issues being adjudicated. 25X1A

--A possible solution to some of the attitudinal problems regarding compartmentation would be a training program that would explain the reasons for compartmentation and emphasize that restriction of access is neither a personal nor a professional insult but a necessary part of the intelligence business.

The preceding views are those of the individual intelligence officers who attended the CSI compartmentation study group's 1 March seminar on formal compartmentation. The CSI team studying compartmentation plans to utilize the opinions and suggestions made by the participants in this seminar in

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its final report. The team welcomes the ideas of other Agency officers who wish to contribute to the exploration of this or other aspects of compartmentation within the CIA.

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